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SYMPOSIUM
THREE LIMITATIONS OF TWOMBLY:
ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY INFERENCES IN
A CONTEXT OF HISTORICAL MONOPOLY
J. DOUGLAS RICHARDSt
INTRODUCTION

In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 1 the Supreme Court has
thrown litigants and lower courts into confusion by consigning to
the dustbin key phraseology 2 that has served as a guiding light
on motions to dismiss for half a century: that a motion to dismiss
should be denied "unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief."3 Because that venerable phrase was
an old friend to attorneys who actively litigate, the Supreme
Court's rejection of it has led many to sense a cataclysmic change
in the legal landscape. 4 Other decisions rendered by the Court
t J. Douglas Richards is a member of the firm of Pomerantz Haudek Block
Grossman & Gross, LLP ("Pomerantz"). He argued the Twombly case on behalf of
the plaintiffs in the district court, the Second Circuit, and the Supreme Court. Views
expressed in this Paper are those of the author and not of Pomerantz or any other
law firm. This paper was first presented at a panel entitled "Litigating an Antitrust
Case After Twombly" at the ABA's Fall Forum on Antitrust Law.
1 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
2 See id. at 1969 ("Conley's 'no set of facts' language has been questioned,
criticized, and explained away long enough.... [T]his famous observation has
earned its retirement.").
3 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), overruled in part by Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
4 See Keith Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 117, 117 (2007), http://www.law.
(noting
northwestern.edulawreview/colloquy/2007/3 lLRColl2007n3lBradley.pdf
that many view the Twombly decision as "a sweeping revision of the standards for
civil pleadings and dismissals in general" and acknowledging that this view "seems
to have prevailed"); Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 138 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.
org/inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf ("[T]he Court's opinion presages more expansive
application.... The best reading of Bell Atlantic is that the new standard is

850

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:849

since Twombly indicate, however, that fears of a major legal
5
earthquake are overblown. In particular, in Erickson v. Pardus,
the Court strongly reaffirms key elements of historical pleading
standards, stating that pleading "[s]pecific facts" is not necessary
and that all factual allegations made in a complaint must be
accepted as true6-neither of which, on first reading, the Court
would seem to have applied in Twombly. Clearly, therefore, a
close reading of the Twombly opinion is in order, to discern which
ground rules have and have not been changed.
Although Twombly is the first Supreme Court decision to
reference a "plausibility" requirement in connection with
antitrust allegations on a motion to dismiss, it is significant that
the Second Circuit's reversed opinion in Twombly-which was
generally perceived to be largely consistent with Conley v.
Gibson7-also had held that "plausibility" is necessary to satisfy
8
governing pleading standards in an antitrust conspiracy case.
The Second Circuit stated, in Twombly, that an antitrust
conspiracy complaint must "include conspiracy among the realm
of plausible possibilities," and found that the allegations of
conspiracy that were made in the case comfortably did so. 9
Because the Second Circuit professed to harmonize its own
"plausibility" requirement with the any "set of facts"
formulation of Conley,10 its opinion was not perceived to effect
major changes comparable to those feared from the Supreme
Court's opinion. In fact, the relative complacency that attended
the Second Circuit's decision was well-founded, since, as a
matter of common usage, it is obvious that a requirement that
an antitrust conspiracy complaint be merely "plausible" is not
intended to raise pleading requirements very high. That is
clear from principles strongly reaffirmed in Twombly itself,
such as that a complaint that satisfies the Court's new
"plausibility" standard must be sustained "even if it strikes a
savvy judge that actual proof of those facts alleged is
absolute, that mere notice pleading is dead for all cases and causes of action.").
5 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007).
6

Id. at 2200.

7 355 U.S. at 45-46 (1957).
8 See Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 111 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Asahi

Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. 111. 2003) (Posner,
J., sitting by designation)), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
9 Id. at 111-12.
10 See id. at 111, 114.
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improbable, and 'that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.' "11
In addition, the Court makes clear in Twombly that it is "not
impos[ing] a probability requirement" for any facts that are
alleged.12
The Twombly opinion confines itself narrowly to the specific
question and context presented, and does little to explain
whether or how broadly the standards that it articulates for the
case at hand should be applied in other contexts.
The
contention of this Paper is that to the extent that Twombly
raises the bar for pleadings, it does so only in the very narrow
context of (1) antitrust conspiracy complaints; (2) only when
those complaints explicitly rest allegations of conspiracy on
pleaded inferences rather than factual allegations; and (3) in
the unique historical context of the telecommunications
industry.
Lower courts should not assume that Twombly
supports or portends significant changes in other contexts,
unless and until the Supreme Court so states in a future case.
It certainly has not so stated in Twombly.1 3
I.

LIMITATION TO ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY

All of the references in Twombly to a "plausibility"
requirement are couched in relation to allegations of antitrust
conspiracy, and not to the pleading of claims generally. 14 Thus,
the introductory section of the Court's analysis takes pains to
place the decision in the limited context of unique antitrust
rules that are designed to guard, in the antitrust conspiracy
context, against possible "false inferences from identical

11 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965.
12

Id.

13 At the time of publication, the only United States Court of Appeals that
appears to have considered in detail whether Twombly is limited in ways analogous
to those suggested here is the Second Circuit, principally in Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d
143 (2d Cir. 2007). Although the court in Iqbal did not embace such limitations, it
did discuss at length the language in Twombly that supports limiting it "only to
section 1 allegations based on competitors' parallel conduct or, slightly more broadly,
only to antitrust cases." Id. at 157-58. A dissent in the case suggests that Twombly
is "less than crystal clear and fully deserve[s] reconsideration by the Supreme Court
at the earlist opportunity" with regard to such questions. Id. at 178.
14 See, e.g., id. at 1964 ("This case presents the antecedent question of what a
plaintiff must plead in order to state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act."); id. at
1965-66 ("In identifying facts that are suggestive enough to render a § 1 conspiracy
plausible, we have the benefit of the prior rulings and considered views of leading
commentators ...").
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behavior at a number of points in the trial sequence."'15 After a
summary of conventional pleading standards in general, the
opinion expresses the requirement of "plausibility" only in the
course of "applying these general standards to a § 1 claim"'16i.e., in stating standards specifically applicable to antitrust
conspiracy claims. The Court then makes plain that its limited
purpose in granting certiorari was "to address the proper
standard for pleading an antirust conspiracy through
allegations of parallel conduct."'17 Importantly, nowhere in the
entire Twombly opinion is the "plausibility" requirement said to
be applicable outside the context of antitrust conspiracy.
Instead, the structure and content of the Twombly opinion
indicate that the "plausibility" requirement that Twombly
articulates is a narrow standard, specially tailored for limited
use only in the specific context of antitrust conspiracy
allegations.
It is entirely plausible that a distinct procedural rule might
be applicable only in antitrust conspiracy cases, which have
been the subject of various distinct procedural rules at least
i8
since Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.
Indeed, one of the issues that was heavily contested by the
parties in the briefs in Twombly was whether the sufficiency of
allegations of antitrust conspiracy under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) should properly be controlled by general
pleading standards, as the respondents contended, or whether
substantive antitrust law required a higher standard in the
particular context of antitrust conspiracy allegations, as was
advocated by both the petitioners and the Solicitor General. 19
The Supreme Court's adoption of a "plausibility" requirement
for antitrust conspiracy cases clearly reflects an acceptance of
the point of view advocated by petitioners and the Solicitor
General, that substantive antitrust law requires that a unique
"plausibility" standard be satisfied in the specific context of
antitrust conspiracy allegations. Thus, there would be no more
justification for applying Twombly's "plausibility" requirement

15 Id. at 1964.
16 Id. at 1965.
17 Id. at 1963 (emphasis added).
Is 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
19 See Reply Brief of Petitioner at 8-16, Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (No. 05-1126),
2006 YL 3265610.
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than Matsushita's unique summary judgment standards, 20 in
cases that assert claims not based on antitrust conspiracy. Just
as courts generally have not applied Matsushita outside the
context of antitrust conspiracy, 2 1 they should not apply
Twombly's "plausibility" standard in other contexts absent
further opinions from the Supreme Court suggesting that to do
so would be appropriate.
II.

LIMITATION TO PLEADED INFERENCES

Even in the context of antitrust conspiracy cases, the
Twombly opinion makes very clear that its analysis is
applicable only to those antitrust complaints that rest their
conspiracy allegations solely on allegations of inferences from
"descriptions of parallel conduct and not on any independent
allegation of actual agreement. '22 This characterization of the
allegations in Twombly is consistent throughout the Supreme
Court's opinion. For example, the opinion's second sentence
states that the limited question presented is "whether a § 1
complaint can survive a motion to dismiss when it alleges that
major telecommunications providers engaged in certain parallel
conduct unfavorable to competition, absent some factual context
suggesting agreement, as distinct from identical, independent
action."23 The Court does observe that the complaint contained
"a few stray statements" that "speak directly of agreement," but
concludes, "on fair reading these are merely legal conclusions
24
resting on the prior allegations."
Importantly, to the extent that a complaint for antitrust
conspiracy alleges any facts suggestive of conspiracy, nothing in
Twombly invites a court to determine whether those factual
allegations are themselves "plausible." On the contrary, the

20 See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 ("To survive a motion for summary judgment

or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must
present evidence 'that tends to exclude the possibility' that the alleged conspirators
acted independently.").
21 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the
Antitrust Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 9, 28-29 (2004); Spencer Weber Waller, Matsushita
at Twenty: A Conference Introduction, 38 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 399, 401-02 (2007); see
also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 HARV. L. REV. 917,
926, 935 (2003) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2001)).
22 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1970.

23 Id. at 1961.
24

Id. at 1970.
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Court takes pains in Twombly to make clear that it is not
inviting lower courts to determine whether they believe or
disbelieve facts alleged in an antitrust conspiracy complaint,
stating that it is "not impos[ing] a probability requirement" for
any facts that are alleged. 25 For example, if a complaint were to
allege outright that particular individuals conspired with one
another, or that a particular trade organization coordinated
conspiratorial communications among antitrust defendants,
those facts must be accepted as true for purposes of a motion to
dismiss. Instead, the "plausibility" requirement of Twombly is
carefully made applicable by the opinion only to pleaded
inferences of conspiracy, and not to factual allegations of
26
conspiracy, when such allegations are made in a complaint.
This consideration is likely to limit the scope of Twombly's
"plausibility" requirement considerably, since relatively few
antitrust conspiracy complaints will rest, as the complaint did
in Twombly, exclusively on pleaded inferences from parallel
conduct and mere general market structure.
III. LIMITATION TO THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS CONTEXT

Even in those relatively few cases that make allegations of
antitrust conspiracy based entirely on proposed inferences from
parallel conduct and market structure, Twombly should have
limited impact since its fundamental rationale will have little
application outside the telecommunications industry.
The
Twombly opinion begins by reciting some basic history of that
industry, 27 which ultimately plays a pivotal role in its analysis.
Before focusing closely on that later analysis, some additional
background
about
the telecommunications
industry is

Id. at 1965.
The meaning of this distinction may be elucidated by the assertion of Justice
Souter at oral argument in Twombly, that the plaintiffs had "by their pleadings, in
effect, affirmatively indicated that they don't have enough facts to support a general
allegation." Transcript of Oral Argument at 9-10, Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (No. 051126). In other words, even if a complaint were simply to allege outright that a
conspiracy existed, the complaint would state a claim. The problem that the Court
found in the Twombly complaint stemmed from the fact that it purported only to
draw an inference of conspiracy from allegations of marketplace conduct that the
Supreme Court believed could not reasonably give rise to such an inference, for
reasons discussed in Part III infra.
27 See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1961-62, 1962 n.1.
25
26
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appropriate in order to put the factual context of Twombly into
clearer focus.
Prior to the divestiture of AT&T's local telephone business
in 1984, telephone service was considered to be the textbook
example of a so-called "natural monopoly" in which, due largely
to enormous fixed costs of installing telephone wires into
individual homes, the "natural outcome" of an unregulated
environment was monopoly rather than a competitive
industry. 28 Long-distance telephone service was separated from
local service in connection with the 1984 divestiture, and was
made competitive on the premise that it did not require the
same massive investment to install wires into individual homes
that was required for local telephone service. 29 The business of
local telephone service continued to function as a monopoly,
however, until the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996
Act"), 30 a primary object of which was to make local telephone
31
service competitive.
To overcome basic hindrances that had made local service a
"natural monopoly," the 1996 Act imposed certain legal
obligations on the regional service monopolies that were
somewhat "socialist" in their character, and that many
perceived to be at odds with traditional competitive principles of
the American economy. 32 Specifically, as the Twombly opinion
points out, the 1996 Act effectively required each of the regional
service monopolists to share its network with competitors. 33 In
Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko,34 the quasi-socialist character of this obligation to share
wires with competitors seems to have played an important role

28 Id. at 1972; Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. F.C.C., 535 U.S. 467, 477-78
(2002); PETER W. HUBER, MICHAEL K. KELLOGG & JOHN THORNE, THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996: SPECIAL REPORT 3 (1996).
29 See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1961; HUBER ET AL., supra note 28, at 17
(discussing incumbent local exchange carriers' obligation to house competitive local
exchange carriers' network transmission equipment).
30 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
31 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1961; 74 AM. JUR. 2D Telecommunications § 16 (2007).
32 See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1961-62; HUBER ET AL., supra note 28, at 11-12
(listing the obligations imposed upon the incumbent local telephone service
providers and the competitors).
33 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1961 (quoting Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices
of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 402 (2004)).
34 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
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in the Court's decision, which limited the application of
antitrust law to the telecommunications industry in the
different context of a monopolization claim. Thus, the Supreme
Court, in Trinko, observed as follows:
Compelling such firms to share the source of their advantage is
in some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law,
since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or
both ....Enforced sharing also requires antitrust courts to act
as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity,3 5 and
other terms of dealing-a role for which they are ill suited.
In light of this quasi-socialist "central planning" character
of the sharing obligation under the 1996 Act, the Supreme
Court, in Trinko, evidently viewed unilateral conduct calculated
to defeat that sharing obligation as being uniquely forgivable as
a matter of antitrust policy, stating that because the 1996 Act
seeks to "eliminate" monopolies while antitrust policy merely
seeks to prevent the creation of them by unlawful conduct,
"[t]he 1996 Act is, in an important respect, much more
36
ambitious than the antitrust laws."
Echoes of those views from Trinko survive in the following
passage of the Twombly opinion, in which the Court expresses
its evident strong conviction that an alternative explanation,
and not conspiracy, explains the stark absence of competition
among the incumbent local telephone service providers
("ILECs") as competitors ("CLECs") in one another's territories,
upon which the complaint in Twombly was fundamentally
premised:
[The ILECs' non-competition with one another as CLECs] was
not suggestive of conspiracy, not if history teaches anything. In
a traditionally unregulated industry with low barriers to entry,
sparse competition among large firms dominating separate
geographical segments of the market could very well signify
illegal agreement, but here we have an obvious alternative
explanation. In the decade preceding the 1996 Act and well
before that, monopoly was the norm in telecommunications, not
the exception. The ILECs were born in that world, doubtless
liked the world the way it was, and surely knew the adage
about him who lives by the sword. Hence, a natural explanation
for the noncompetition alleged is that the former Government-

35
36

Id. at 407-08.
Id. at 415.
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sanctioned monopolists were 3 7sitting tight, expecting their
neighbors to do the same thing.
This is the most pivotal text in the Twombly opinion.
Significantly, the Court itself hypothesizes a mutually
interdependent state of mind as the "natural" explanation of the
ILECs' non-competition with one another as CLECs. In the
ordinary sense of the word "plausible," it would certainly seem
"plausible" to suggest that such a mutually interdependent
state of mind may have been supported by unlawful
communications between the ILECs, at a time when the ILECs
clearly were regularly working together intensely to attempt to
effect a legislative repeal of the sharing obligation itself. The
Court, however, seems to have viewed such a mutually
interdependent plan of the ILECs to avoid competition with one
another to be uniquely "natural" and benign, in light of the
38
"history" of the ILECs as government-sanctioned monopolies.
Similarly, the Court's opinion seems dismissive of the
expectations of Congress that the ILECs would compete with
one another as CLECs, stating that "Congress may have
expected some ILECs to become CLECs in the legacy territories
of other ILECs, but the disappointment does not make
39
conspiracy plausible."
In sum, the Court's reasoning in Twombly seems to be
based largely on a belief that the fundamental expectation
embodied in the 1996 Act-that the ILECs acting in their own
economic self-interests would seek to compete as CLECs in one
another's territories-was unrealistic from the outset and was
contrary to natural competitive impulses that antitrust policy in
a competitive economy generally seeks to nurture. Indeed, that
37
38

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1972 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1975 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

39 Id. at 1973 (majority opinion); see also id. at 1972 (characterizing the failure
of the ILECs to compete with one another as having been merely "[c]ontrary to
hope"). Additional indications of the Court's idiosyncratically dim view of the
expectations of Congress in the 1996 Act may be found in Justice Scalia's statement
at oral argument that "I used to work in the field of telecommunications and if the
criterion is that happens which Congress expected to happen when it passed its law,
your case is very weak." Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Twombly, 127 S. Ct.
1955 (No. 05-1126). The author's recollection is that Justice Scalia said that his son
had worked in the telecommunications industry, not that Justice Scalia himself had
done so, as the transcript currently available on the Court's website indicates. For
present purposes, however, the significance of Justice Scalia's statement is
unaffected by this difference.
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bias seems fundamentally to have slanted the Court's reading of
the actual allegations made in Twombly, given that the Court
states that the Twombly complaint "does not allege that
competition as CLECs was potentially any more lucrative than
other opportunities being pursued by the ILECs during the
same period."40 In fact, the complaint in Twombly plainly did
allege that competition of the ILECs with one another as
41
CLECs was "an especially attractive business opportunity."
Only remarkably finicky reasoning would draw a critical
distinction between alleging that competition with one another
as CLECs would have been "more lucrative than other
opportunities,"' 42 and the allegation, which clearly was made in
Twombly, that it would have been "an especially attractive
business opportunity."' 43 The Supreme Court, in Twombly,
seems to have premised its analysis on so microscopic a
distinction only because, as is manifest in Trinko, the Justices
idiosyncratically perceived the "sharing" obligations of the 1996
Act-notwithstanding their enactment by Congress in formal
legislation-to have been unrealistic and fundamentally
contrary to the economic self-interests of each of the ILECs.
Ordinary procedural norms would suggest that such
judgments should be reserved until a later stage of the
proceedings, so that a court would have the benefit of evidence
from discovery and expert analyses before making them. That
seems particularly true in view of the fact that even the
Solicitor General's brief in Twombly, while advocating a
heightened pleading standard, twice conceded that whether
such a heightened standard would be satisfied by the
allegations in Twombly was a "close question." 44 The Court in
Twombly, however, seems to have felt that it knew enough to
make that judgment without any assistance, in the specific
context of the telecommunications industry.
It seems improbable that many future antitrust cases
arising outside the telecommunications industry will provide
such a basis for trumping inferences from evidently non40 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1972.
41 Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint
40, Twombly v. Bell Atl.
Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2003) (No. 02-CV-10220).
42 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1972.
43 Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 41,
40.

44 Brief for Solicitor General as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 26,
Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (No. 05-1126).
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competitive behavior, based on a prior history of governmentsanctioned monopolies. Indeed, the Court, in Twombly, hastens
to point out that the same pattern of behavior alleged in the
Twombly complaint would in fact be suggestive of a "plausible"
conspiracy in most other contexts. 45 Ultimately, therefore,
Twombly is best perceived as stemming uniquely from this
Court's idiosyncratic skepticism concerning perceived economic
unrealism of the "sharing" obligations contained in the
1996 Act. Twombly thus should have limited impact in future
antitrust conspiracy cases, even when those cases are based
solely on pleaded inferences from mere market behavior, as the
Court concluded-rightly or wrongly-that the Twombly case
was, rather than on facts or events indicative of conspiracy.

45 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1972 ("In a traditionally unregulated industry with
low barriers to entry, sparse competition among large firms dominating separate
geographical segments of the market could very well signify illegal agreement.").
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